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HIS year saw interesting applications and reminders in a number
of areas, including trade secrets, tortious interference, the tort of
"economic duress," and others.
I. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL AND
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
A. TRADE SECRETS, OR SOMETHING LESS?
Global Water Group, Inc. v. Atchley, contained a concise review of
Texas trade secret law with regard to whether a trade secret exists.' The
Dallas Court of Appeals held that information failing to meet the six-
factor analysis of In re Bass2 does not qualify as a trade secret-at least in
cases where the purported secrets were not acquired by "unfair means."' 3
In the 1990s, Global Water Technology (GWT) developed the first suc-
cessful self-powered, self-contained water purification system and consid-
ered it a trade secret, taking appropriate measures to maintain secrecy by
requiring all employees to sign confidentiality agreements. 4 Atchley, the
defendant, was GWT's president and had access to all of GWT's informa-
tion, including the information underlying the self-powered, self-con-
tained water purification system. One year after Atchley's 1994
resignation, Global Water Group (GWG) acquired GWTs assets, includ-
ing its trade secrets.
When Atchley began manufacturing portable self-sustained water puri-
fication systems through his company Aspen Water, Inc., GWG sued as-
serting conspiracy and trade secret misappropriation. A jury awarded
GWG $1 million in damages because it found that Atchley and his com-
pany had misappropriated two of GWG's trade secrets: (1) a formula
used in the "mixed media pod," "a device used to remove contaminates
from water," and (2) a "sequence of the process" used for purification. 5
The trial court, however, granted Atchley and Aspen's motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, which asserted that neither the formula
nor the sequence constituted trade secrets and entered a take-nothing
judgment.6
With respect to the "formula," GWG used a canister containing the
materials KDF and carbon that removed chemicals from water.7 The
benefits of using these chemicals was apparently no secret, as other man-
ufacturers used them as well. GWG's president testified the formula was,
nonetheless, unique in the industry because it contained an approximate
10:90 ratio of KDF to carbon. The manufacturer of KDF recommended
1. 244 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
2. 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003).
3. Global Water Group, Inc., 244 S.W.3d at 928-30.
4. Id. at 927.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 929.
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using more KDF than carbon, and according to GWG's president, other
companies' ratios were "nowhere close" to GWG's 10:90 ratio. There was
also testimony that GWG had guarded the formula through limiting ac-
cess and requiring its employees to sign confidentiality agreements.
According to the court, however, "[t]he status of the information
claimed as a trade secret must be determined through a comparative eval-
uation of all the relevant factors, including the value, secrecy, and defi-
niteness of the information as well as the nature of the defendant's
misconduct."'8 The court concluded that the alleged misconduct was not
egregious; GWG had not shown that the formula was valuable, contrib-
uted to the success of the water purification system (that is, the formula
was unrelated to the system's novel features), or gave GWG a competi-
tive advantage; and there was no evidence of the money or effort it took
to develop the formula.9 The court also noted that the formula could be
easily reverse-engineered, and it was not precise. 10 According to the
court, because of the "imprecise nature of [the] formula ... [ijt thus be-
comes apparent, it would be difficult to protect such a 'formula,' without
prohibiting fair competition.""1
The court also noted that the imprecise nature of the formula made
proving misappropriation difficult:
Aspen allegedly "used" Global's trade secret because its product,
like Global's, used much more carbon than KDF. While the two
products were similar in this regard, there were also differences in
the contents of the mixed media pods. For example, Aspen's product
contained "separator pads" that kept the KDF and carbon separate.
Global's product, on the other hand, used another purifying sub-
stance, PM 1000, as well as gravel. In light of these differences, and
the fact that the similarities lie only in the percentages of two com-
monly used ingredients, no inference of use arises. We conclude
there is legally insufficient evidence to show misappropriation of the
formula of Global's mixed media pod. 12
As for the sequence of the treatment process, GWG did not contend
on appeal that its three-step process constituted a trade secret. 13
B. DEPARTING EMPLOYEES: THREE FABLES WITHOUT
A CONSISTENT MORAL
Three significant cases during the Survey period illustrated the diffi-
culty-and, sometimes, the seemingly inconsistent results-of resolving
trade secret cases involving departing employees.
In the first of these, Nova Consulting Group, Inc. (Nova) and Engi-
neering Consulting Services, Ltd. (ECS) were competing environmental
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 930.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 931.
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consulting firms.14 Nova had an office in San Antonio that generated
millions in annual revenue by 2001. When ECS decided to enter the San
Antonio market, it hired key employees away from Nova. Over the fol-
lowing two years, ECS generated comparable revenues in its San Antonio
office. During that same period, Nova's revenues dropped significantly.
Nova's employees had employment agreements that barred them from
ever disclosing confidential information and from competing against
Nova or soliciting other Nova employees for one year after leaving
Nova. 15 Nova filed suit against ECS and four former Nova managers al-
leging that:
ECS ignored Nova confidentiality agreements by requiring the for-
mer Nova employees ... to load into its database client information
taken from Nova; ECS allowed former Nova employees.., to solicit
and hire employees still working at Nova to also join ECS; ... ECS'
conduct damaged Nova through loss of client base and loss of key
employees; and ECS intended to harm Nova .... 16
Prior to trial, the district court ruled by summary judgment that Nova's
covenants not to compete were overbroad and unenforceable but that
claims for unfair competition through misappropriation of trade secrets
and tortious interference remained at issue.17 A jury found that ECS un-
fairly competed with Nova by misappropriating trade secrets and tor-
tiously interfered with the employment agreements.18 The jury awarded
Nova past and future lost profits, plus exemplary damages.1 9 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed.20
On appeal, ECS argued unsuccessfully that (1) the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support the verdict for misappropriation of trade secrets and for
tortious interference with Nova's employment agreements and (2) the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the six-factor common-
law test used by Texas courts to determine the existence of a trade
secret.21
The Fifth Circuit held that evidence was sufficient to prove the client
information taken by former Nova employees and loaded into the ECS
database was confidential and constituted a trade secret. 22 While the in-
formation consisted of a collection of business cards, testimony presented
at trial confirmed that the "cards contained handwritten notes with fur-
ther details gathered about clients through dealings with them, such as
names of contact persons, cell-phone numbers, and other notes."' 23 There
14. Nova Consulting Group, Inc. v. Eng'g Consulting Servs., Ltd., 290 F. App'x 727,
729-30 (5th Cir. 2008).
15. Id. at 729.




20. Id. at 729.
21. Id. at 736-39.
22. Id. at 736-37.
23. Id. at 736.
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was also evidence that ECS acquired those trade secrets by breach of a
confidential relationship because it knew the Nova employees it was hir-
ing had employment agreements barring them from disclosing Nova's
confidential information.2 4 There was evidence that ECS used the Nova
trade secret information without authorization. 2 5 The court of appeals
held that the evidence supported a "finding that ECS used Nova trade-
secret client information to gain new customers and to increase reve-
nues." 26 There was also sufficient evidence to support the tortious inter-
ference verdict because ECS interfered with the confidentiality
provisions of the Nova employment agreements and induced their
breach. 27
ECS also argued that the six-factor trade-secret test from In re Bass 28
should have been included in jury instructions.2 9 Dismissing the point,
the court of appeals noted that the test is merely a tool used by courts to
determine if evidence of a trade secret exists, and while the factors are
relevant, they are not dispositive.30 The court stated that it is impossible
"to state the precise criteria for determining the existence of a trade
secret."31
Conversely, an employee's disclosure of the mere identity of potential
client accounts to his new employer, a competitor of his former company,
did not constitute a theft of trade secrets in Bluebonnet Petroleum, Inc. v.
Kolkhorst Petroleum Co.32
Bluebonnet is a classic case of the potentially disastrous recipe of mix-
ing family and business. There a brother and sister worked at Bluebonnet
Petroleum. The sister, Keithy Smith, was the president of the company,
and her brother's title was disputed. The brother, Ray Robinson never
signed any employment agreement, nondisclosure agreement or a cove-
nant not to compete. 33 Between 2001 and 2005, Robinson acquired nu-
merous new accounts for Bluebonnet, increased its gasoline sales volume,
and became the face of Bluebonnet for its customers. In January 2005,
Robinson was in contact with various convenience stores to gain their
business, including Circle G in Gonzales, Texas, when he was contacted
by Bluebonnet competitor Kolkhorst Petroleum. Robinson accepted the
employment offer from Kolkhorst and proceeded to a previously sched-
uled meeting with Circle G to present a deal from Bluebonnet. During
the meeting, he informed Circle G that he would not be servicing the
account, as he was leaving Bluebonnet to work for Kolkhorst. Circle G
24. Id. at 735-36.
25. Id. at 736-37.
26. Id. at 737.
27. Id. at 738-39.
28. 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003).
29. Nova Consulting Group, Inc., 290 F. App'x at 742.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. No. 14-07-a379-CV, 2008 WL 4527709, at *5-8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Oct. 9, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
33. Id. at *1.
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had second thoughts about the contract, and it eventually executed a con-
tract instead with Kolkhorst after a subsequent sales presentation in
which Robinson recused himself from involvement. 34
Bluebonnet sued Robinson and Kolkhorst for, inter alia, theft of trade
secrets and tortious interference with prospective business relationships.
The trial court dismissed both claims on summary judgment. 35 The Hous-
ton Court of Appeals affirmed. 36 The. court reasoned that, although
Brother gave the names of some potential customers, including Circle G,
to his new employer, there was no evidence he revealed additional infor-
mation on the accounts (such as feasibility studies, notes, or customer
preferences). 37 The court held that the mere identity of the potential ac-
counts was not even proprietary information under the circumstances of
this case, much less a trade secret. 38
II. DEFAMATION AND BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT
A. FACT, OPINION, AND CORPORATIONS AS PRIVATE PARTIES
Unflattering remarks posted on an internet webpage were the focus of
Super Future Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. 39
After a significant dispute arose among a certificate holder, the "spe-
cial servicer," and the trustee for two commercial mortgage-backed secur-
ities trusts, some individuals and their relatives who were opposed to
Orix, the "special servicer" created a website at www.predatorix.com
(called "Predatorix"-a clever combination of "Orix" and "Predator").
Orix alleged that the website contained a number of derogatory state-
ments about Orix that constituted "libel per se, business disparagement,
tortious interference with contractual relationships, [and] common law
conspiracy .... ,,40 The defendants responded that the website statements
were nonactionable opinion, satire, or parody.41 Although the website
publishers were actually counter-defendants in the procedural posture of
the case, they will be referred to as "defendants" here for convenience.
It is settled, of course, that in order to be considered defamatory, state-
ments must be statements of fact rather than opinion. Whether state-
ments are an assertion of fact or opinion is a question of law, which
depends on "'their verifiability and the context in which they were
made." 42 This analysis must be made regardless of whether the speaker
couches his statements as "just my opinion. '43 As the court read Bentley,
it was not enough for a call-in television talk show host to state, even
34. Id.
35. Id. at *2.
36. Id. at *1.
37. Id. at *5.
38. Id. at *7.
39. 553 F. Supp. 2d 680, 684 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 686, 687.
42. Id. at 687 (quoting Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 583 (Tex. 2003)).
43. Id. at 688.
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repeatedly, that it was his "opinion" that a judge was corrupt. 44 The
court quoted Judge Friendly's comment, cited in Bentley, that "[it] would
be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accu-
sations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly,
the words 'I think."'45
In addressing the Bentley analysis of verifiability and context to the
statements made on Predatorix, the court concluded first that these were
indeed "verifiable statements of fact as opposed to protected opinions. ' 46
The statements included an assessment of the amount of money Orix
spent in a matter and the amount of recovery, accusations of specific be-
havior, statements taken out of context to imply a different meaning, ac-
cusations of lying and other statements taken out of context, accusations
of engaging in behavior similar to those of another institution, and a
statement that one party had won or lost a case-all of which the court
viewed as susceptible of verification. 47
Significantly, the court added that a "disclaimer that '[t]his is my pri-
vate information and opinion' does not transform the statements into
opinions. '48 Considering the context, the court found that the website
purported to give factual information about Orix's behavior; it provided
links to court documents, deposition videos, news articles and court cases;
and at least one writer claimed to verify the accuracy of the information
he was posting. 49 In this context, the court concluded that these state-
ments were not protected opinions. 50
Nor were the statements satire or parody.51 The test for satire or par-
ody is "'whether the publication could be reasonably understood as
describing actual facts." 52 Here, the court found that a reasonable per-
son would find that the Predatorix site "describes actual facts."'53 The site
referred to actual cases, cited several documents for support, and pur-
ported to gather factual information to document Orix's alleged miscon-
duct. Accordingly, the court found that the statements were not satire or
parody.54
Of particular interest was the issue of whether Orix-a large corpora-
tion-was a public or private figure for purposes of the libel analysis.
This would matter for Orix's burden of proof, since "[t]ruth is an affirma-
tive defense in a defamation case brought by a private plaintiff" and not
an element of the private plaintiff's burden of proof.55 Furthermore, a
44. Id. at 687-88.
45. Id. at 688 (quoting Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 584).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 688-89.
48. Id. at 689 (citing Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 584).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 689.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Tex. 2004)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 691-92.
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private plaintiff only needs to show negligence, not actual malice. 56
In determining whether a corporation is a public or private figure, the
court noted that the Fifth Circuit has established a three (non-exclusive)
factor test: (1) "'the notoriety of the corporation to the average individ-
ual in the relevant geographical area,"' which considers the size and na-
tionality of the corporation; (2) "the nature of the corporation's
business," particularly whether it makes or markets consumer goods; and
(3) "the frequency and intensity of media scrutiny. ' 57 Here, the court
found that Orix was indeed a large and successful loan servicing provider,
but average individuals would not necessarily be familiar with it.58 Thus,
the court concluded that "this factor weigh[ed] slightly in favor of finding
that Orix [wa]s a private figure."' 59 Additionally, Orix did not make or
market consumer products or offer services to the general public, which
also weighed in favor of Orix being a private figure for these purposes.
Additionally Orix was publicized only in its own industry, which the court
did not conclude gave it a public figure status either.60 Accordingly, the
court concluded that Orix would be considered a private figure for pur-
poses of the litigation. 61 Furthermore, the court rendered that the issue
was not a matter of significant public interest.62
B. ATT'ORNEYS' FEES: "SPECIAL DAMAGES" TO
SUPPORT BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT?
Super Future Equities held that in order to establish a claim for busi-
ness disparagement, a plaintiff must show "'(1) the defendant published
false and disparaging information about it, (2) with malice, (3) without
privilege, (4) that resulted in special damages to the plaintiff." 63 Proof
of special damages is an essential part of the claim, requiring, in effect,
the showing of "pecuniary loss that has been realized or liquidated as in
the case of specific lost sales."'64
The court concluded that Orix had not established special damages in
the form of loss or trade or deals.65 Apparently there was no evidence
that the vitriol available on the "Predatorix" website had actually been
absorbed by any Orix customers or clients.66 It had, however, evidently
been thought serious enough to justify considerable legal expense in try-
56. Id. at 692 (citing WFFA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998)).
57. Id at 689 (quoting Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir.
1993)).





63. Id. at 692 (quoting Forbes v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex.
2003)).
64. Id. (quoting Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. 1988),
(internal quotations omitted).




ing to close the website down.67 The question arose, then, whether the
attorneys' fees required in order to address the closure of the site could
be "special damages" sufficient to meet the Hurlbut standard.
Interestingly, the court "express[ed] no opinion" on whether attorney's
fees could constitute special damages.68 It did note, however, that "[t]he
Fifth Circuit has held that under Texas law, 'attorneys fees incurred in
bringing a lawsuit [to stop the business disparagement], where no addi-
tional pecuniary loss has been identified, do not establish the element of
special damages required to support a claim of business
disparagement.' ",69
C. WHEN IS HIRING A WOMAN A "MISTAKE'?" WHEN SAYING So
LEADS TO A DEFAMATION CLAIM
Whether a statement was subject to a meaning that was defamatory of
the plaintiff was one issue in Klouda v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary.70
Professor Klouda, a female, was a tenure-track professor at Southwest-
ern Baptist Theological Seminary. 71 The religious seminary's decision
not to renew her employment or to offer her tenure was found to be "the
product of a sincerely held religious belief" on the part of the seminary
president and members of the board of trustees, and thus, the court con-
cluded that the employment decision made by the defendants was ecclesi-
astical in nature. 72 The court concluded that the "ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine" and narrow "ministerial exception" in challenges to
a religious institution's employment decisions would prohibit judicial re-
view of the employment decision, and the court denied the employment
related claims.73
One of the claims brought by the plaintiff, however, was that the Semi-
nary President had said to Professor Klouda that hiring her was a "mis-
take," while the chairman of the Seminary's Board of Directors had told
a newspaper reporter that hiring a woman to teach men was a "momen-
tary lack of parameters. ' 74 As an additional ground of dismissal, the
court held that "[n]either statement is subject to a meaning defamatory of
plaintiff. '75 "If either of the statements reflects badly on anyone," the
court added, "it would be defendants." 76
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 693 n.9 (quoting C.P. Interest, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 696 (5th
Cir. 2001)).
70. 543 F. Supp. 2d 594, 597 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
71. Id. at 596.
72. Id. at 611-12.
73. Id. at 611-13.
74. Id. at 613-14.




III. LANHAM ACT SECTION 43(A)
A. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND THE "UNEXCEPTIONAL" CASE
The Lanham Act permits a court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to
a prevailing party "in exceptional cases."' 77 This was considered in Avid
Identification Systems, Inc. v. Phillips Electronics North America Corp.78
Here, the jury found the defendant liable both for patent infringement
and for having falsely advertised that its veterinary device for reading
tags implanted within animals could read all types of tags used in the
United States.79 The court noted that to recover attorney's fees, "the pre-
vailing party must demonstrate the exceptional nature of the case by clear
and convincing evidence;" that "[a]n exceptional case is one where the
violative acts can be characterized as 'malicious,' 'fraudulent,' 'deliber-
ate,' or 'willful;' and that an 'exceptional case' requires 'a showing of a
high degree of culpability on the part of the infringer, for example, bad
faith or fraud .... [A] few cases have gone as far as to require very
egregious conduct."' 8 0
The plaintiff asserted that Phillips claimed its device could read all
types of tags, even while knowing that it could not. The trial court wrote
that after careful consideration of the trial record, however, it found that
the plaintiff "did not prove that its case was exceptional under the Lan-
ham Act by clear and convincing evidence." 81
B. PROFITS: FACT OF INJURY, VERSUS AMOUNT
In Mannatech, Inc. v. GlycoProducts International, Inc., the Northern
District of Texas considered whether an accounting of the defendant's
profits attributable to its false advertising of a dietary supplement should
be awarded. 82
The jury found the defendant had realized $150,000 in profits attributa-
ble to false advertising. In post-trial motion for judgment, however, the
court noted that "an award of profits is not automatic upon a finding of
liability."'83 Instead, to decide if it should award an accounting of profits,
the court should consider a number of factors, including:
(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2)
whether sales have been diverted, (3) the adequacy of other reme-
dies, (4) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in asserting his
rights, (5) the public interest in making the conduct unprofitable, and
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
78. No. 2:04-CV-183, 2008 WL 819962, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2008).
79. Id. at *1-2.
80. Id. at *2 (quoting Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1390 (5th Cir.
1996)).
81. Id.
82. Mannatech, Inc. v. Glycoproducts Int'l, Inc., No. 3-06-CV-0471-BD, 2008 WL
2704425, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2008).




(6) whether it is a case of palming off.84
In applying these factors, the court particularly noted the first two. The
jury found the violation was not willful, which the court found suggested
that the defendant did not intend to confuse or deceive.8 5 The court de-
termined that this factor was important. The court also found the evi-
dence that any of plaintiff's sales had been diverted as a result of the false
advertising of its mark insufficient. 86 "In order to obtain an accounting of
profits," the court held, "a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
benefitted from its alleged infringement. '8 7 The court added that
"[p]rofits are rarely awarded where the plaintiff cannot establish that the
false advertising caused a decline in sales."8 8 The plaintiff testified that
some sales associates complained about the false advertising and asserted
that it had lost sales due to the presence of the defendant's products in
the market.8 9 But when the plaintiff's president was asked if he could
"quantify or even estimate the amount of sales lost on account of such
false advertising," the answer was "beyond speculative." 90
The other factors were no further help to the plaintiff. The court con-
cluded that "while requiring defendant to account for $150,000 in profits
undoubtedly would serve the plaintiff's interests, it would not necessarily
serve the public interest." 9 1 In addition, the court found that a perma-
nent injunction against any further false advertising would provide an ad-
equate remedy condemning "the nature of the infringing conduct and its
adverse effect on plaintiff."'92 The court cited to two cases from other
circuits as support for the proposition that damages are "not appropriate
in a trademark action where an injunction will satisfy the equities of the
case."
93
Unquantified injury in the context of a section 43(a) infringement was
the issue in Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing and National Distri-
bution Co.9 4 Here, a restaurant franchisor brought a Lanham Act suit
against its former food distributor and purchasing agent, claiming that the
former purchasing agent had dramatically misrepresented the nature of
its relationship with franchisor and, thus, violated section 43(a) of the
84. Id. at *3 (citing Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 814 (2003)).
85. Id. (citing Quick Techs., Inc., 313 F.3d at 349 (noting that "willful infringement is
an important factor")); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 372 n.9 (5th Cir.
2000) (noting a lack of authority within the Fifth Circuit for awarding an accounting of
profits in the absence of willfulness).
86. Mannetech, 2008 WL 2704425, at *3.




90. Id. at *3-4.
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Synergistic Int'l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2006);
Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir. 1994)).
94. 520 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2008).
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Lanham Act. 95 Schlotzsky's claimed that Sterling had dramatically over-
stated its (Sterling's) authority by widely asserting that it was not only a
purchasing agent appointed by both Schlotzsky's and a franchisee associ-
ation, but also that it had been appointed by Schlotzsky's and the associa-
tion "to be their exclusive representative in the purchasing of
products. '96 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Schlotzsky's
claims fell within the scope of section 43(a), in that Sterling's actions vio-
lated the prohibition against representations of fact that are "likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another. '97 However, "the
evidence of a wrong being committed [was] clear," while "the evidence of
precise damage [was] not."'98 The court's examination of the evidence did
"not reveal much of a means to place a dollar value on the effect of Ster-
ling's actions." 99 There was, in short, no proof of a monetary amount of
the damages.
The court held that the injury element of the claim was satisfied, how-
ever, because the evidence of Sterling's misstatements to numerous fran-
chisees and distributors that it was Schlotzsky's "exclusive
representative" constituted sufficient evidence that it was likely that it
had damaged Schlotzsky's. 100 This was true even though a "dollar value
on the extent to which this plan succeeded-maximizing Sterling's in-
come at the expense of others including Schlotzsky's-was not
proven."' 01 A permanent injunction followed, along with an award of
attorneys' fees. 10 2
IV. NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS
A. FOCUSSING ON WHAT THEY DID
Since the Texas Supreme Court's Sheshunoff opinion in 2006,103 a num-
ber of cases seem to have trended toward preferring substance over form
in determining the enforceability of non-compete agreements. Though
not without the twists, turns, and contradictions that have characterized
Texas non-competition law for twenty years or more, many non-compete
agreements that might once have been found unenforceable are now be-
ing found viable. The opinions that follow suggest that Texas courts are
increasingly less willing than before to invalidate an agreement simply
because an explicit, enforceable promise to provide confidential informa-
tion is not present. Instead, courts seem willing to examine an agreement
in its totality to assess whether the parties envisioned that the employee
95. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006).
96. Schlotzsky's, 570 F.3d at 398.
97. Id. at 399-400 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)).
98. Id. at 400.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 401.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 402-03.
103. Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006).
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actually would be entrusted with serious and valuable confidential infor-
mation of the employer over the course of his or her employment, of the
sort that would properly give rise to the employer's interest in enforcing a
noncompetition covenant. And it appears the results often turn on the
extent to which the employee was actually so entrusted.
A post-employment noncompetition covenant was analyzed in Ray
Mart Inc. v. Stock Building Supply of Texas LP.10 4 The facts were inter-
esting: Weldon Vybiral had been the general manager of a door mill op-
eration in Temple, Texas for thirteen years when Stock Building Supply
bought the company. The new owner required all branch managers to
sign employment agreements that included covenants of nondisclosure,
nonsolicitation, and noncompetition. Vybiral signed such an
agreement. 1
0 5
Some time afterwards, another building supply company (Tri-Supply)
opened a door mill in Temple. 10 6 Vybiral soon left Stock and went to
work for Tri-Supply. In the following months, more than a dozen other
Stock employees followed him to Tri-Supply. The profitability of Stock's
Temple facility suffered, and eventually, Stock closed the facility alto-
gether. Predictably, Vybiral, the other former Stock employees, and Tri-
Supply all asserted that, when Stock took over the Temple operation,
working conditions worsened and that "unhappy workers and unhappy
customers eventually left Stock of their own volition."'1 7 Stock claimed
they were deliberately poached by Tri-Supply, which was aided by
Vybiral's active collusion.
The district court found for the former employees in all respects, con-
cluding that the non-compete and non-solicitation covenants were not en-
forceable, that the employees had not breached any fiduciary duty to
Stock, and that neither they nor their new employer had tortiously inter-
fered with Stock's relationships with its employees.' 0 8 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 10 9
Enforceability of a non-compete covenant is, of course, a question of
law. To determine whether a noncompete covenant is ancillary to an oth-
erwise enforceable agreement, the court must first identify an "otherwise
enforceable agreement" between the employee and the former employer
and then determine whether the noncompete covenants is "ancillary to"
that agreement."10 Most Texas employment agreements are "at will,"
meaning that the employer can dismiss the employee at any time and for
any reason, aside from affirmatively unlawful ones, thus making the ap-
pearance of a promise of continued employment illusory and not "other-
wise enforceable" and, hence, insufficient consideration for a non-
104. 302 F. App'x 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 235.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 234.
110. Id. at 236.
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compete covenant.111 Interestingly, however, Mr. Vybiral's new employ-
ment agreement with Stock was for a term of three years and provided
that he could not be fired without cause. The court of appeals concluded
this promise to employ Vybiral for three years and Vybiral's promises in
return to work for Stock for three years and not to disclose trade secrets
or other confidential information he obtained while working for Stock
constituted "an otherwise enforceable agreement." 112
To be "ancillary to" an otherwise enforceable agreement, the consider-
ation given by the promisee (Stock) must give rise to its interest in re-
straining the former employee from competing, and the covenant must be
designed to enforce that consideration or return promise. 113 The court
noted that a "term" employment agreement for a period of years would
not necessarily be one to which a non-compete covenant could be ancil-
lary in this sense because it would not necessarily involve the employee
receiving anything so intangible and valuable that it could only be pro-
tected by non-competition. 114 Entrusting Vybiral with trade secrets or
other confidential information or perhaps providing him with specialized
training in the operations of the company might have sufficed in this re-
spect. The opinion did not say one way or the other, but it appears that
Stock did not expressly commit to give these to Vybiral.115 The court
found persuasive, however, Stock's argument, that as general manger of
the Temple operation, Vybiral would necessarily be made privy to such
confidential information as price lists, sales strategies, and customer in-
formation and that Vybiral was given access to this information over the
course of his employment. 1' 6 "While admittedly a close call," the court
held that this did give rise to an interest in protecting the confidential
information and, hence, that the noncompete covenant was ancillary to
an otherwise enforceable agreement.' 17
In a footnote, the court contrasted this case with others in which courts
had found that an employer's consideration did not give rise to an inter-
est in restraining an employee from competing by explaining that Stock
had "articulated a coherent theory explaining how its promise to Vybiral
gives rise to an interest in restraining Vybiral from competing."" 8 Inter-
estingly, the court did not address whether Stock had treated those price
lists, sales strategies, and customer information as trade secrets and taken
reasonable precautions to protect them, which is among the first princi-
ples of trade secret protection.119
111. See Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Tex. 1994).
112. Ray Mart, Inc., 302 F. App'x at 236-37.
113. Id. at 236 (citing Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644
(Tex. 2006)).
114. Id. at 237.
115. See id. at 237-38.
116. Id. at 238.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 230 n.4 (citing Olander v. Compass Bank, 172 F. Supp. 2d 846, 855 (S.D. Tex.
2001)).
119. See In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003).
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"Preparation to compete" also figured prominently in this case.120
While appearing implicitly to agree that Vybiral owed a fiduciary duty to
Stock while serving as its general manager of the Temple operation, the
court reviewed the district court's rulings for clear error and concluded
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Vybiral did not
interfere impermissibly with the relationships between Stock and its em-
ployees.1 21 Although Stock believed that Vybiral had solicited the other
employees to leave, Vybiral presented testimony that he had not.
Vybiral's evidence left Stock with "little to point to besides suspicion,"
122
and there was no real evidence of it besides another departing salesper-
son having left "a Tri-Supply form on the desks of one or two other Stock
employees."'1 23 Stock alleged that Vybiral and another employee
breached their fiduciary duties to Stock by not telling Stock that Tri-Sup-
ply was opening a facility in Temple, that they were leaving, and that
others intended to leave; but the court held that "the district court very
reasonably could have found this behavior to be permissible preparation
for competition."t 24
In Staples, Inc. v. Sandler, the Northern District of Texas focused on
the need to locate a promise by the employer to provide confidential in-
formation to the employee but was content to find it in a separate, con-
temporaneously-signed document.12 5 It should be noted that the original
opinion was vacated pursuant to an "Agreed Order Concerning Resolu-
tion."'1 26 The Agreed Order provides that the case will be administra-
tively closed, pending final dismissal in August 2009 unless a party
notifies the court of reasons that it should not be dismissed.' 27 One might
infer that after the opinion was issued, the parties reached a settlement
which called for some specific performance by both parties at some point
between then and August 2009, and one of the conditions of the settle-
ment likely was that the court's earlier opinion be vacated. It is, there-
fore, no longer controlling precedent and should not be cited. It may,
however, provide helpful practical guidance on how these sorts of mat-
ters may be decided.
When employee Sandler join Staples, he signed a "Proprietary and
Confidential Information Agreement" and a separate "Non-Compete
and Non-Solicitation Agreement" ("Non-Compete Agreement"). 12 8 In
120. Ray Mart, Inc., 302 F. App'x at 239.
121. Id. at 240.
122. Id. at 239.
123. Id. at 246.
124. Id. (citing Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) ("The employee has no general duty to disclose his plans and
may secretly join with other employees in the endeavor without violating any duty to the
employer.")).
125. See generally Staples, Inc. v. Sandler, No. 3:07-CV-0928-K, 2008 WL 4107656 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 29, 2008) (mem. op.), vacated, 2009 WL 1285838 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2009).
126. Staples, Inc. v. Alan Sadler Preferred Office Prods., Inc., No. 3:07-CV-0928-K,
2008 WL 1285838, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2009).
127. Id.
128. Staples, Inc., 2008 WL 4107656, at *1.
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the "Recitals" section of the Non-Compete Agreement, Staples recited
that it "ha[d] and [would] entrust Employee with proprietary informa-
tion, strategies, knowledge, customer relationships and know-how which
would be detrimental to the Company if disclosed. ' 129 The court held
that, under Sheshunoff, 30 this recital was a "unilateral contract condi-
tioned upon performance. '1 31 The court added that "the confidentiality
agreement signed contemporaneously with the noncompete provided a
promise of confidential information. Thus, Staples promised to provide
Sandler with confidential information that would give rise to its interest
in restraining Sadler from competing.' 32
Sandler was subsequently given "access to cost margins, pricing lists,
sales figures, and assorted business information, including customer infor-
mation" that was not readily available to the public. 133 None of the infor-
mation would constitute "trade secrets of the highest order," but it was
confidential enough to constitute sufficient consideration for the non-
compete agreement. a34 The court held that an employer need not pro-
vide confidential information that rises to the level of trade secrets in
order to have an enforceable covenant not to compete. 135 The court also
made clear that the quality and extent of the information provided would
be significant in determining a reasonable (or unreasonable) scope of
protection. 136
In Shoreline Gas, Inc. v. McGaughey, an at-will employee was bound
by an agreement that contained promises by the employee not to disclose
the employer's confidential information and not to engage in post-em-
ployment competition. 137 But, significantly, the agreement was com-
pletely void of any obligation on the part the employer to provide
confidential information to the employee.' 38 Without addressing whether
a promise could be implied as the Fifth Circuit found later in Ray Mart,
the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals instead leaped past the issue and
found that the employer had, in fact, provided that type of information.
Thus, the non-compete agreement was an enforceable unilateral contract
that had been accepted by performance.' 39
The court explained:
McGaughey's promise not to disclose Shoreline's confidential infor-
mation, though not enforceable when made, constituted an offer for
a unilateral contract which Shoreline had the option to accept.
129. Id. at *3.
130. Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 44 (Tex. 2006).





136. Id. at *4.
137. No. 13-07-364-CV, 2008 WL 1747624, at *6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Apr. 17,
2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
138. Id.
139. Id. at *6-7.
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Shoreline accepted McGaughey's offer by performing-that is, by
supplying McGaughey with confidential information-and so a uni-
lateral contract was formed under which McGaughey became bound
by his promise not to disclose that information. Under Sheshunoff,
such a unilateral contract constitutes an "otherwise enforceable
agreement" sufficient to support an accompanying non-compete
covenant. 1
40
The court dismissed McGaughey's contention that the agreement was
unenforceable because it did not contain a promise by the employer to
provide the employee with confidential information. 141 McGaughey re-
lied on Sheshunoff for his argument.1 42 While the employment contract
in Sheshunoff required the employer to provide the employee with "ac-
cess to certain confidential and proprietary information and materials be-
longing to Employer," that promise, like the one at issue in Shoreline, was
illusory because the employer could have avoided performance simply by
terminating employment.1 43
Thus, as long as the employer actually provides confidential informa-
tion to the employee (even absent a written express or implied promise
by the employer to do so), the employee's promise not to disclose confi-
dential information is no longer illusory, and a unilateral contract is
formed when the employer does so provide it.144 According to the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Shoreline, this unilateral contract is
an otherwise enforceable agreement sufficient to support a promise by
the employee not to compete. 145
B. TIMING MATTERS
Timing also matters. In Powerhouse Productions, Inc. v. Scott, the issue
arose as to whether confidential information given before the effective
date of a noncompetition covenant could properly serve as
consideration.146
In Powerhouse Productions, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a
take-nothing judgment entered in favor of Defendant Eric Scott. 147 Pow-
erhouse builds rocket packs of the sort made famous by "James Bond
007" and, more recently, by "Super Dave Osborne." Scott went to work
for Powerhouse in 1993, where he was taught about the operation, main-
tenance, fuel manufacturing, and techniques, and most notably, how to
fly the rocket pack machines. 148 Scott eventually made over 400 flights
140. Id. at *6 (internal citations omitted).
141. Id. at *6-7.
142. Id. at *6.
143. Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Serv., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 646-47, 650 (Tex.
2006).
144. See Shoreline Gas, Inc., 2008 WL 1747625, at *6.
145. Id.
146. Powerhouse Prods., Inc. v. Scott, 260 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no
pet.).
147. Id. at 693.
148. Id. at 694.
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throughout the world while employed with Powerhouse and charged cli-
ents up to $25,000 to fly his rocket at their event.
Scott signed a non-compete with the owner of Powerhouse when he
started his employment in 1993.149 Scott's employment agreement and
non-compete agreement were not with the Powerhouse entity, which was
not formed until 1996 or 1997, but rather, with the owner individually.
That agreement expired around 2000. However, Scott remained em-
ployed with Powerhouse. In 2004, Scott entered into a confidentiality and
non-compete agreement with Powerhouse whereby Scott agreed not to
compete with Powerhouse for a five-year period. Scott and Powerhouse
ended their relationship later that same year. 150
In 2005, in contravention of his non-compete agreement with Power-
house, Scott went to work for another rocket pack builder. 15 1 After
learning that Scott was making flights for a competitor, Powerhouse filed
suit seeking to enjoin Scott from violating the non-compete agreement. 152
The trial court and the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected Powerhouse's
argument that confidential information and training provided to Scott
before 2004 could serve as consideration for the 2004 non-compete agree-
ment.153 Further, letting Scott fly the rocket pack, the Court reasoned,
did not "give rise to [Powerhouse's] interest in restraining [Scott] from
competing."'154 While each of Scott's 400 Powerhouse flights was expen-
sive, they did not amount to the proper consideration that disclosure of
confidential information would have. 155
Timing also mattered in Staples, Inc. v. Sandler.15 6 Though holding that
an employer need not necessarily provide confidential information that
rises to the level of a trade secret, the Northern District of Texas went on
to hold that the restrictions contained in the Non-Compete Agreement
prohibiting Sandler from doing business not only with Staples' customers
but also with customers or prospective customers that Sandler "knew,
serviced, or was familiar with prior to joining the Company" were overly
broad.1 5 7 The court said:
[h]ere, it is apparent that the restraint on competition is not justified
to the extent contemplated in the covenant not to compete given
Sandler's relatively short employment, the minimal amount of confi-
dential information he received, and Staples' legitimate interest in





152. Id. at 695.
153. Id. at 697-98.
154. Id. at 697.
155. Id. at 696-98.
156. No. 3:07-CV-0928-K, 2008 WL 4107656 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008) (mem. op.), va-
cated, 2009 WL 1285838 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2009).




Thus, the court found that Staples' legitimate interest in confidentiality
gave rise only to a restraint on Sandier that would keep him from trans-
acting business with customers that he acquired while with the com-
pany. 159 A restraint that "prevents him from continuing long-standing
relationships that he brought with him to Staples is overbroad, unrelated
to Staples' legitimate interest in confidentiality, and would further unrea-
sonably burden these third-party customers.' '160
V. COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION
The nature of common-law unfair competition was at issue in Vantage
Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp.16 1
Here the defendant sent letters to a number of third parties in the in-
dustry, claiming he could prohibit the plaintiff from "making, using or
selling a bottom dump trailer having features depicted in [the letter-
writer's] alleged [trademark].' 162 The plaintiff claimed that this assertion
by the defendant constituted common law unfair competition.163
The court noted the traditional rule that, under Texas law, "'[t]he tort
[of unfair competition] requires that the plaintiff show an illegal act by
the defendant which interfered with the plaintiff's ability to conduct its
business,"' and that the illegal act "'must at least be an independent
tort.' "164
In this case, the court held that the "necessary implication" of the un-
fair competition claim was that the defendants' assertion was unfair com-
petition either because the defendant's purported trademark was invalid
in the first place or because the plaintiff's possible product did not in-
fringe it.165 In this case, however, no case or controversy (as required to
support a declaratory judgment action) had actually arisen when the case
was filed on either of those points.166 Consequently, neither premise
could serve as an "independent tort" to support the plaintiff's unfair com-
petition claim. 167 Otherwise, the court held, "[p]laintiff would impermis-
sibly be pursuing through the back door the identical claims analyzed
[earlier in this opinion] above and over which the Court finds it has no
jurisdiction, namely, that the Mark was either invalid or that Plaintiff's
preliminary depiction of a trailer would not infringe Defendant's valid
Mark.' 68 Accordingly, the unfair competition claim was dismissed. 169
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. No. H-06-3008, 2008 WL 304747 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2008) (mem. op.).
162. Id. at *7.
163. Id.









A. WITH WHICH AGREEMENT ARE WE INTERFERING?
Stock's tortious interference claims appear to have been argued in two
respects: first, that Tri-Supply tortiously interfered with Vybiral's employ-
ment agreement with Stock, by recruiting and hiring Vybiral while aware
of (and in spite of) his noncompete agreement with Stock; and second,
that Tri-Supply tortiously interfered with Stock's employment agreement
with its other employees, by using and directing Vybiral and another de-
parting salesman to solicit and encourage the other Stock employees to
leave. 170 Because the Fifth Circuit held that Vybiral's noncompete cove-
nant was indeed enforceable, and because it felt that the district court's
dismissal of the tortious interference claim as to the noncompete cove-
nant may have stemmed from its potentially erroneous conclusion that
the covenant was invalid, the court reversed and remanded for the district
court to consider whether Tri-Supply might have tortiously interfered
with Stock's employment agreement with Vybiral. 17 1
But since the district court had not clearly erred in concluding that
Vybiral's actions could not be considered improper solicitation of the
other employees, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's conclu-
sion that there was no tortious interference through Vybiral and the
others with Stock's employment agreements with its other employees. 172
B. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE By ANY OTHER NAME
Amigo Broadcasting, KP v. Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc.,
presented an interesting "departing employee" tortious interference case
in the context of Spanish-language radio broadcasting. 173
In the early 1990s, Joaquin Garza developed the Spanish-language ra-
dio show "El Chulo y La Bola." Garza played the character "El Chulo,"
while Raul Bernal played "La Bola" and other fictional characters. In
April 2002, Garza and Bernal signed three-year employment contracts
with Amigo Broadcasting to perform the show on Amigo's Spanish-lan-
guage station in Austin. Amigo aggressively promoted the show, which
became very successful. Soon, Amigo syndicated the show to other Span-
ish-language stations through Latin Entertainment Network. Latin En-
tertainment Network's CEO was Tony Hernandez.17 4
In about May or June 2003, when Garza and Bernal's employment con-
tracts were a little less than halfway through their three-year terms,
Amigo ended its relationship with Latin Entertainment Network and
Hernandez. 17 5 Garza and Bernal continued to broadcast the show from




173. 521 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2008).




Amigo's Austin station, but Mr. Hernandez set out to look for some new
syndicating possibilities for the "El Chulo" show. Later in 2003, Spanish
Broadcasting System (SBS) responded to Mr. Hernandez's proposals.
On November 12th, Hernandez, Garza, and Bernal met with officials of
SBS in Miami, even though Amigo had learned of the meeting and wrote
SBS asking it not to interfere with its employment agreements with Garza
and Bernal. SBS asked for and received copies of the employment agree-
ments and concluded the two radio personalities could resign from
Amigo and go on-air in Los Angeles or other SBS markets in which
Amigo did not compete. Soon afterwards, SBS sent new employment
contracts to Garza and Bernal, and on November 25 and 26, Garza and
Bernal did not perform the show on Amigo.176
The first questions involved the employment contracts. The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the particular language found in these
three-year employment contracts placed considerable restrictions on
Garza and Bernal's abilities to resign their employment, at least without
breaching the agreements.17 7 A license agreement was also included in
the employment contracts. However, Garza and Bernal licensed Amigo
to use their names and likenesses in promoting the "El Chulo" show and
agreed not to grant any such licenses to third parties during the terms of
their employment or for one year afterwards.
Here, an interesting question arose: did "their names," in this context,
refer to their legal names (Garza and Bernal), or to their radio personal-
ity names ("El Chulo" and "La Bola")? 178 The court of appeals con-
cluded that there was a latent ambiguity in the contract, creating a fact
issue as to which name was intended.179 There were no damages, how-
ever, because Amigo's asserted damages arose from its lost profits (or, in
the alternative, its lost investment) from loss of the show to SBS. 1 80 This
loss resulted from the radio personalities' resignations-not from breach
of the license.18' Amigo had not asserted that Garza and Bernal's breach
of the license agreement allowed SBS to compete with Amigo, thereby
further diminishing Amigo's profits. This may have been related to SBS's
earlier point-apparently not persuasive to the court of appeals-that
SBS did not compete in the same markets as Amigo.182
The other principal issue involved Amigo's claim that SBS had tor-
tiously interfered with Amigo's employment contracts with Garza and
Bernal. Clearly, in the court of appeals' view, SBS should have realized
that Garza and Bernal would have specific employment contracts with
Amigo; in any event, SBS did know after Amigo sent it the November
176. Id. at 478-79.
177. Id. at 482.
178. Id. at 488.
179. Id. at 488-89.
180. Id. at 489.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 478.
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12th letter.18 3 Two points here were of particular interest.
First, SBS asserted that because it had concluded Garza and Bernal
were free to resign without breach, it could not have had the requisite
intent to interfere with the agreements.184 The court held that this inter-
pretation was "unreasonable," however, and consequently could not be
considered in reviewing the sufficiency of Amigo's evidence.1 85 Even
more significantly, however, the court went on to hold that even if SBS
did have a good faith belief that Garza and Bernal could resign without
breach, SBS would still be liable for tortious interference in causing them
to do so.1 8 6 This should be compared, however, with the 1996 Texas Su-
preme Court case of Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, which held that a
good faith, colorable (albeit mistaken) belief in the lawfulness of one's
actions could be a defense to a claim of tortious interference.1 87
SBS further asserted that its actions throughout were merely responses
to the requests and initiatives of Mr. Hernandez, relying on the concept
that "'[n]o wrong is committed where the employee acts upon his own
initiative and the new employer is merely receptive to the employee's
suggestions.'"l 8 8 The court of appeals held, however, that a reasonable
jury could believe that SBS's action had gone far beyond being "merely
receptive" to Hernandez's actions and instead, actively pursued and in-
duced Garza and Bernal to work for SBS.18 9 The court held that a new
employer is only "merely receptive" to an employee's suggestions "where
the employee resigns for his own personal reasons independent of any act
or inducement on the part of the new employer." 190
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING
Governments are among the largest purchasers in the economy, so it is
no surprise that complaints of tortious conduct arise in that connection
from time to time. Texas Logos, LP v. Brinkmeyer, presented interesting
questions of tortious interference in the context of competition for the
award of a valuable state contract.1 91
Here the contract was the "logo sign contract" awarded periodically by
the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT). Plaintiff Texas
183. Id. at 491.
184. Id. at 492 n.24.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 1989) (stating
.. the terminable-at-will status of a contract is no defense to an action for tortious inter-
ference with its performance")).
187. Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Tex. 1996) (supporting that no
action for tortious interference will lie for persuading a contracting party to exercise a right
it has under a contract); cf. ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 431 (Tex.
1997).
188. Amigo, 521 F.3d at 493 n.26 (quoting Custom Drapery Co. v. Hardwick, 531
S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ)).
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, no writ)).
191. Tex. Logos, LP v. Brinkmeyer, 254 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
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Logos, LP had been the incumbent bidder, but when the contract was
awarded to a competitor, it brought suit alleging that a now-former
TxDOT engineer, "in combination with the winning vendor and others,
had unlawfully skewed the procurement process so as to cause Texas
Logos to lose the contract."'1 92 The principal allegation was that in return
for the promise of valuable consulting contracts in the private sector, Mr.
Brinkmeyer used his influence within TxDOT to manipulate the decision-
making process through a number of acts, which Texas Logos felt resulted
in a competitor being considered the "best value," despite what it claimed
were a number of objective criteria to the contrary. 193
The district court dismissed Texas Logos' common law tort claims for
money damages, believing it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear
them.19 4 Texas Logos, however, asserted that it was not challenging
TxDOT's award of the logo sign contract to the new vendor, but it was
seeking instead "to enforce long-established common-law rights against
private parties over which the district courts continue to possess subject-
matter jurisdiction."1 95 The defendants claimed this was "nothing more
than a backdoor means of attacking the validity of the Logo Sign pro-
curement,' 96 but Texas Logos insisted that its tort damages claims would
not require re-litigation over whether the logo sign contract proposal pro-
vided the "best value" to the state but instead, would merely require a
decision as to "whether, in the absence of [defendants'] ... conduct, it is
probable that Texas Logos would have received [the contract]."'197
The court of appeals agreed with Texas Logos.198 Although there
would be some overlap between the determination of how TxDOT made
its decision and whether, but for the defendant's conduct, that decision
would have been in Texas Logos' favor, the court found no "legislative
intent to divest Texas courts of their subject matter jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate such issues even when they arise in the context of common-law tort
claims." 19 9 Instead, the court focused on the fact that, in order to prevail
on its tortious interference theory, Texas Logos did not need to .prove
that its proposal would have provided the best value for the State per se,
or that TxDOT was "wrong" in its determination; it only needed to show
that, but for the defendant's conduct, the decision would have been in its
favor, "not that the tribunal's decision was wrong on the record before
it." °200 For the elements needed to prove tortious interference with a pro-
spective contract, the court cited Texas Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v.
Waste Management Holdings, Inc., requiring a prospective-contract plain-
tiff to establish, among other things, "'a reasonable probability that the
192. Id. at 646.
193. Id. at 649-52.
194. Id. at 646.
195. Id. at 653.
196. Id.






parties would have entered into a business relationship .. .and actual
harm or damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's
interference, i.e., that the defendant's actions prevented the relationship
from occurring."' 20 1
The claims against the former TxDOT engineer, Mr. Brinkmeyer, in his
personal capacity were also reinstated and allowed to proceed. Mr.
Brinkmeyer had claimed sovereign immunity (an appropriate defense to
suit brought against him in his official capacity) and official immunity (an
appropriate defense to suit for personal monetary liability in his individ-
ual capacity), but the court concluded that:
any assertions that Texas Logos has pled only acts shielded by Brink-
meyer's official immunity or within his official capacity are without
merit, [as those defenses apply only to] acts within a governmental
employee's performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good
faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their
authority.202
D. HARM: ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAIN
A related issue of injury or harm was also fatal to Orix's claim for tor-
tious interference in Super Future Equities.20 3
To show tortious interference with a contract, the willful and inten-
tional act of interference must proximately cause the plaintiff's injury.204
This element requires "cause in fact or substantial factor and foreseeabil-
ity.' 2 0 5 The Northern District of Texas found no evidence of proximate
causation of harm, as no sales or other trade had apparently been lost.206
Interestingly, Orix claimed that its harm was its attorney's fees incurred
in having to bring the action.20 7 The court read DP Solutions to hold that
attorney's fees incurred in previous litigation can be recovered in a later
suit for tortious interference with contract, but it "limited this holding to
situations 'where the natural and proximate results and consequences of
prior wrongful acts had been to involve a... plaintiff in the litigation with
and against third parties and other parties.' "208
201. Id. at 654 n.7 (quoting Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings,
Inc., 219 S.W.3d 563, 590 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied)).
202. Id. at 658-59 (citing Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 843 (Tex.
2007)).
203. Super Future Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A., 533 F. Supp. 2d 680
(N.D. Tex. 2008).
204. Id. at 694 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77
(Tex. 2000)).
205. Id. (citing Video Ocean Group LLC v. Balaji Mgmt. Inc., No. Civ.A. H-03-1311,
2006 WL 964565, at *9 (S.D. Tex. 2006)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 694 and n.13 (citing DP Solutions, Inc. v. Rollins, Inc., 353 F.3d. 421, 431 (5th
Cir. 2003)).
208. Id. at 695 n.13 (citing DP Solutions, 353 F.3d at 431 (quoting Tex. Beef Cattle Co.
v. Green, 883 S.W.2d 415, 430 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994), reversed on other grounds,
921 S.W. 2d 203 (Tex. 1996))).
[Vol. 62
Business Torts
E. INTENT IN A TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CONTEXT
The nature of intent in a tortious interference context was an issue in
Ewbank v. ChoicePoint Inc.20 9
Here, a consumer reporting bureau allegedly provided an inaccurate
criminal background check to a prospective employer, reporting an arrest
on a marijuana charge (subsequently dismissed) some years earlier. The
bureau corrected its mistake by email two days later, but it did not do so
before the plaintiff's prospective employer had withdrawn its conditional
offer of employment. At the plaintiff's request, the bureau did send the
prospective employer a corrected report a few days later, but the pro-
spective employer maintained its refusal to employ the plaintiff. The
plaintiff brought suit for tortious interference with prospective business
relationships and with existing contracts, among other claims.210
The Northern District of Texas noted that to bring a claim for tortious
interference with prospective business relations, among other elements,
the defendant would have to be shown to have acted "with a conscious
desire to prevent the relationship from occurring, or [with knowledge]
that the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a
result of his conduct. 211 Tortious interference with contract would simi-
larly require showing a willful and intentional act of interference. 212
Summary judgment was entered for the bureau, because the court found
no evidence that the bureau had intentionally acted to interfere with the
contract or prospective business relations.213 "There is no evidence that
in reporting, and then correcting, the information requested by [the pro-
spective employer], ChoicePoint intentionally reported the incorrect in-
formation that presumably cost Ewbank her job opportunity. '21 4
Note the interesting nuance of difference here between intending to
report information, on the one hand, and intending to report incorrectly
on the other.
F. LESS CONFUSED THAN PERHAPS THEY THINK THEY ARE
In 2008, there were indications that, with respect to the elements re-
quired to show tortious interference with prospective business relation-
ships in Texas, the federal courts of the Fifth Circuit may have believed
that they were more confused than they actually were. In Nano-Propri-
etary, Inc. v. Canon, Inc., the Fifth Circuit cited back to a 2002 case, recal-
ling that "[t]he Texas Supreme Court has not yet set out the elements of a
tortious interference with a prospective business contract or relations
claim, and the appellate courts have not been uniform in their characteri-
209. 551 F. Supp. 2d 563 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (mem. op.).
210. Id. at 565.






zation of such actions. '215
The court summarized several cases to "require a 'business relation-
ship' while others require a 'contractual relationship,"' 216 but, interest-
ingly, did not discuss the seminal case of Walmart Stores, Inc. v.
Sturges.2 17 There the Texas Supreme Court did discuss the elements of a
cause of action for tortious interference with prospective contracts or
business relationships on the one hand, and tortious interference with ex-
isting contracts on the other, and explained the reasoning behind the dif-
ferent elements (competition having already concluded in the one, but
not yet having concluded in the other).2 18 In Nano-Proprietary, the dif-
ference between tortious interference with contracts or business relation-
ships did not really matter because the plaintiff had "presented no
evidence of a reasonable probability of either an impending business rela-
tionship or contractual relationship. '2 19 Therefore, the claim of tortious
interference was properly dismissed in any event. 220
Nano-Proprietary was cited by the Northern District of Texas just a few
months later in L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, LP v. Lockheed
Martin Corp.2 21 The L-3 case involved claims of misconduct in the inter-
national market for refurbishment of P-3 anti-submarine aircraft. L-3 al-
leged that Lockheed was claiming to foreign governments and other
prospective purchasers that it owned certain data necessary for aspects of
refurbishing the P-3 aircraft, that a license would be necessary for anyone
to use that data, and that plaintiff L-3 did not have such a license for use
in foreign contracts. 222
L-3 claimed that Lockheed's assertions prevented L-3 from effective
competition for that limited market. Lockheed responded that L-3 had
not shown a reasonable probability that it would have entered into a con-
tract with anyone.223 Without commenting on whether L-3 would or
would not eventually be able to prove its claims2 24 the court noted that
there were only two competitors, or at least very few, in the market, so L-
3 would be a likely contract candidate for any contract.225 Thus, L-3 had
"pled a reasonable probability that a foreign country would enter into a
contract with it" for refurbishing the P-3 aircraft. 22 6
215. Nano-Proprietary, Inc. v. Canon, Inc., 537 F.3d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 300 F.3d 620, 634 (5th Cir. 2002)).
216. Id.
217. 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001).
218. Id.
219. Nano-Proprietary, 537 F.3d at 403-04 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 404.
221. No. 3:07-CV-0341-B, 2008 WL 4391020, at *11 n.13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2008).
222. Id. at *8.
223. Id. at *11.
224. Id. (quoting Bell Ati. Co. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) ("[A] well-
pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of these





Nano-Proprietary found its way into a footnote in the case, noting the
Fifth Circuit
belief that there are two lines of thought in Texas appellate courts
regarding the elements [for tortious interference with prospective
business relationships], with the only difference being in the first ele-
ment requirement of some courts of only a business relationship and
other courts requiring a more formal contractual relationship. As of
yet, the Fifth Circuit has not determined the issue of the extent of the
required relationship, and this Court finds it unnecessary to do so as
well. 227
VII. TORT OF ECONOMIC DURESS
Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing and National Distribution, Inc.
also raised the seldom-seen claim of economic duress.2
28
Sterling claimed that Schlotzsky's had tortiously interfered with Ster-
ling's contract with various franchisees by compelling those franchisees to
terminate their contracts with Sterling and cease doing business with it, in
favor of representatives or suppliers whom Schlotzsky's preferred. Ster-
ling claimed that this was a form of economic duress. The Fifth Circuit
held that economic duress requires a showing of "(1) a threat to do some-
thing beyond the legal right of the party making the threat; (2) an 'illegal
exaction or some fraud or deception' occurs; and (3) a restraint arises that
is 'imminent' and destroys 'free agency without present means of
protection.' ",229
This was not a case of economic duress, the court held, because
Schlotzsky's had the legal right to execute the contracts it did.230 As the
franchisor, "Schlotzsky's had the right to set quality standards for its
products," and to "approve all suppliers and distributors of [its] branded
products."'23 1 As a result, it was within Schlotzsky's contractual rights to
insist that its franchisees abandon other arrangements and deal exclu-
sively with the applicable, approved distributor for their regions. 232
There was thus no threat or commission of an act that was beyond
Schlotzsky's legal rights. Sterling lost, the court concluded, only "what it
was always legally vulnerable to losing." 2 33
227. Id. at *11 n.13 (citing Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 300 F.3d 620,
639-35 (5th Cir. 2007)).
228. Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & Nat'l Distrib., Inc., 520 F.3d 393 (5th
Cir. 2008).
229. Id. at 404 (citing Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. Am. Bus. Ctr.,
Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1993)).
230. Id. at 405.
231. Id. at 404-05.





The target of the "gripe site" at issue in Super Future Equities, Inc. v.
Well Fargo Bank Minnesota, NA, also claimed that the defendants had
conspired with one another to create the website and publish the defama-
tory statements.234
The Northern District of Texas noted that conspiracy requires: "(1) two
or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds
on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts;
and (5) damages as the proximate result. ' 235 The court added that
"[1]iability for conspiracy depends on participation in an underling
tort. "236
Here, the court found that there was evidence that the defendants had
been involved in creating and maintaining the "Predatorix" website and
creating documents for it, activities from which one could infer conspir-
acy. 237 According to the court, the "object" of the meeting of the minds
was to publish defamatory material about Orix; the "overt act" was the
publication of that material on Predatorix; and the "underlying tort"
would be libel per se, a cause of action for which damages are
presumed.2 38
Interestingly, the court did note that a corporation "cannot conspire
with itself, no matter how many of its agents participated in the wrongful
action. '239 But this doctrine would not apply if Orix proved that the de-
fendants conspired to form the corporation that committed the acts. 240
234. 553 F. Supp. 2d 680 (N.D. Tex 2008).
235. Id. at 695 (citing Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 300 F.3d 620, 635 (5th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W. 2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983))).
236. Id. (citing Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996)).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 695-96 (citing Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 604 (Tex. 2003)).
239. Id. at 695 n.15 (citing Leasehold Expense Recovery, Inc. v. Mothers Work, Inc.,
331 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 2003)).
240. Id. at 696 n.15 (citing C. Albert Sauter Co. v. Richard S. Sauter, Co., 368 F. Supp.
501, 510 (E.D. Penn. 1973) ("The [intra-corporate conspiracy] rule does not apply when, as
here, the defendants conspired, prior to the formation of a corporation, to form a corpora-
tion for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.")).
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